Andrew M. Davis’ Metaphysics of Exo-Life: Toward a Constructive Whiteheadian Cosmotheology is a contribution to current thought about what we might encounter if and when we find life elsewhere in the universe. Before tackling this book, it would be very helpful to review your Philosophy 101 courses notes and review what “realism” and “nominalism” mean to philosophers.

It would also be advisable to learn a thing or two about Alfred North Whitehead and process theology. The book is part of a conversation in which I suspect most of us are not participating, but a “Wikipedia-level” understanding of the major themes of discourse easily makes the book a worthwhile read. Radically oversimplifying things, “processes” replace both the materialistic notions of classical physics and earlier notions of essences in the explanation of how the universe is structured.

The book’s stated purpose is to “widen our view” of the opportunities the universe provides. Davis does this by analyzing Steven J. Dick’s six proposals for “naturalistic cosmotheology” in light of the contributions of Whitehead. He inverts Dick’s proposals, turning them from restrictive expressions to metaphysical exemplifications. Dick’s six proposal are:

1.     Humanity is not physically central to the universe

2.     Humanity is not central biologically, mentally or morally in the universe

3.     Humanity is not at the top of the great chain of being in the universe

4.     Cosmology must be open to radically new and non-supernatural conceptions of God…a God grounded in cosmo-evolution

5.     Cosmology must have a moral dimension, extending ro embrace all species in the universe – a reverence and respect for life in any form

6.     Cosmotheology must embrace the idea that human destiny should be linked to natural cosmic events, not to the divine (p. 30).

Davis addresses the first three proposals by changing the language from “Humanity is not…” to “Humanity exemplifies,…” which allows him to apply Whitehead’s metaphysics to the arguments he makes. The imperative nature of the remaining three proposal is challenged simply by asking od Dick why it must be so, since the claims go largely unsubstantiated or wrecked on the shoals of paradox.

The reader needs to be patient as all this unfolds. Davis has a euphuistic style (to my lights), that makes for slow going. Some of this is in laudable and necessary pursuit of philosophical elegance and precision, but some is not.

As the terms of discourse undergo explanation, we learn Whitehead’s definition of metaphysics, and its goal. It is “the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.” (p.24). If we are successful in defining such a metaphysic, then we will “…fail to find in experience any elements intrinsically incapable of exhibition as examples of general theory.” It is “the hope of rationalism” (p. 26). Some may recall that Kurt Gödel called that hope into question in 1931, and Davis astutely mentions it.

At the root of “process” anything is necessary insistence upon evolutionary development as a fundamental aspect of the universe. It would seem that this notion would provide a stable foundation for metaphysical development, but it simply isn’t so. Recent discoveries about the mechanism of evolution lead us to question now the recapitulation theory of Ernst Haeckel’s. The presumption that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny has been shown to be something less than the whole story, given the reality of horizontal gene transfer, even between species. A presumed orderly progression from “lower” organisms to more complex ones turns out to be a tangled story (see David Quammen, The Tangled Tree) that challenges metaphysicians mightily. This book doesn’t go near the issues raised by that, nor should it. At the center of the target is Dick and his six proposals after all, and nothing else.

Equally problematic, at least IMHO, is Whitehead’s definition of a body: “…that portion of nature with which each moment of human experience intimately cooperates.” As a theist accustomed to thinking of a body being a visible expression of God’s love, I find it entirely too mechanistic. Left undefined are “nature,” (hardly self-explanatory), “moment” (mine or yours – a baby’s or an adult’s? What of time’s arrow?), “human experience” (uniform for everyone? Scope, please?), and “cooperation” (who’s cooperating with who/what? Tell me more about the operations, please). To me, the sentence seems as vague as “The body, well, you know what I mean.” But that’s just me.

Along with Laplace, we are told that Dick has dispensed with the supernatural. “I have no need of that hypothesis,” famously said Laplace to Napoleon (maybe). Whitehead finds it attractive though, for the same reason Napoleon did – it explains many things. As long as God is treated as a concept, God is indeed quite useful. For theists like me though, God cannot be described as a concept, nor is God simply a functional aspect of a philosophy, invoked to make things work. Whitehead is quoted as saying that “the purpose of God is the attainment of value in the temporal world.” (p. 102). He is not speaking of any God with whom or to whom I’m familiar.

The logic gets even more bizarre as pages are turned; Dick proposes a “super-intelligent” naturalistic entity we could name “God” that could presumably change the values of the physical constants that make our universe what it is. Davis points out that such entities couldn’t possibly have been created in any universe where the constants have changed – it wouldn’t be our universe.

There are wonderful explorations of mind, possibility, creativity and value in the discussions and recharacterizations of Dick’s proposals. They will likely excite the reader to do some creative thinking, whether the reader agrees with what’s said or not. For instance, I was intrigued by Whitehead’s notion that “where there is possibility there is mind; and where there is infinite and necessary possibility, there is infinite and necessary mind.” (p. 82). This notion is claimed to coincide with the primordial mind of God as an all-inclusive actuality and hence it’s not far from orthodox Christian descriptions of the mind of God. It is what prevents the universe from “disjointed stagnation.” But it isn’t clear why disjointed stagnation shouldn’t really be the rule. This reminded me of certain descriptions of the classical physical notion of the law of stationary action. It’s true, and very helpful, but no one knows why it’s so.

Chapter 6, “Process Theology and Extraterrestrial Life [A History], provides an excellent survey of research and discussion of the topics. Someone simply interested in the general themes, thinkers and authors associated with process theology and extraterrestrial life might find this quite handy.

I would recommend this book to anyone who enjoys philosophical conversations. Does it tell you if there are Muslims on Mars? No, but you’ll be attuned to how the conversation might go should the little green men actually show up one day.

Disclosure of Material Connection: I received this book free from the author and/or publisher through the Speakeasy blogging book review network. I was not required to write a positive review. The opinions I have expressed are my own. I am disclosing this in accordance with the Federal Trade Commission’s 16 CFR,Part 255.